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Corresponding orders have been issued along the line of the Peoples' Commissar of Railways and GPU transport [divisions].

5. Provide a brief factual report on the state of affairs with the mass exodus of peasants in your oblasts no later than six o'clock the evening of January 24.

Secretary, CC CP(b)U, *Khatayevich*  
Chairman, Ukrainian SSR RNK, *V. Chubar*

RGASPI, fond 17, list 42, file 80, sheets 9-11;

Tragedy of the Soviet countryside. Collectivization and dekulakization, documents and materials in five volumes. Vol. 3. (Moscow, 2001, 1007 pp) *Tragedia sovietskoi derevni. Kolektivizatsia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy: v 5 tomakh* pp.635-636;

TsDAHO Ukrayiny fond 1, list 16, file 9, sheets 115-116;

Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) *Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv* pp.341-342

\* The last two sentences of this paragraph are the verbatim retelling of the order signed by Stalin on January 22, 1933. (See Document 50).

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#52

Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo strengthening the CP(b)U Central Committee and oblast organizations

January 24, 1933

The CC AUCP(b) considers it to be established fact that the Party organizations of Ukraine have failed to perform the tasks assigned [to them] by the Party for organizing grain procurement and fulfilling the grain delivery plan, even after its threefold reduction.

The CC AUCP(b) considers the critical oblasts that will decide the fate of Ukraine's agriculture and should be secured to be Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv oblasts.

The CC AUCP(b) resolves to:

1) Appoint Comrade Postyshev [to the posts of] Secretary CC CP(b)U, First Secretary of the Kharkiv oblast party committee and CC AUCP(b) Secretary.\*

2) Appoint Comrade Khataievich First Secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast Party committee while remaining Secretary of the CC CP(b)U.

Appoint comrade Razumov First Secretary of the Odesa oblast Party committee.\*\*

Relieve comrades Mayorov, Stroganov and Terekhov of their duties and send them to the CC AUCP(b) for further assignment.

Comrades Postyshev, Khataievich and Razumov should begin performing their new duties no later than January 30.

RGASPI, fond 17, list 3, file 914, sheet 13.

\* Pavel Postyshev remained secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party until February 1934.

\*\* The resolution concerning Razumov was canceled; Evgeniy Veger (1899-1938) was confirmed as the first secretary of the Odesa oblast committee of the CP(b)U. He was the first secretary of the Crimean ASSR's Communist Party from 1930.

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#53

Summary from the Peoples' Commissariat of Justice, Ukrainian SSR to the CC CP(b)U on the number of verdicts for the evasion of grain deliveries, sabotage and grain speculation (excerpt)

January 29, 1933

### THE BATTLE FOR GRAIN BY JUDICIAL BODIES

Judicial repressions in Ukrainian SSR during the 4th five-day period of January 1933.

#### **1. Non-delivery of grain**

##### **A. Number of repressions**

In 182 raions of the Ukrainian SSR (data on Vinnitsa oblast not provided), 1,306 people were convicted for non-delivery of grain during the fourth five-day period of January, which is on average more than seven convictions per raion.

The dynamics of judicial repressions for each five-day period in January is based on the following data:

1 <sup>st</sup>	five-day period	- 6	per raion
2 <sup>nd</sup>	five-day period	- 8	per raion
3 <sup>rd</sup>	five-day period	- 6	per raion
4 <sup>th</sup>	five-day period	- 7	per raion

Thus, in January, the numbers of repressions in quantity were quite high and practically stable for each five-day period. Minor fluctuations in the number of repressions for different five-day periods are completely natural.

The greatest number of repressions were applied in Chernihiv oblast (15 per raion), the fewest in Donetsk oblast (2 per raion). The number of repressions applied in the key grain oblasts is illustrated by the following data:

Dnipropetrovsk oblast	- 11	per raion
Kharkiv oblast	- 8	per raion
Odesa oblast	- 6	per raion

##### **B. Pressure along class lines**

Of the 1,306 convicted of non-delivery of bread, 375 people (30 percent) were kulaks, 936 (70 percent) were contract farmers.

Compared to the [rest of] of January, the percentage and number of convicted grain hoarders fell slightly during the 4<sup>th</sup> five-day period. The breakdown of repressions

applied to different social groups for each five-day period in January is illustrated as follows:

1 <sup>st</sup>	five-day	January	-	kulaks	30 %
2 <sup>nd</sup>	five-day	January	-	kulaks	33 %
3 <sup>rd</sup>	five-day	January	-	kulaks	35 %
4 <sup>th</sup>	five-day	January	-	kulaks	30 %

### C. Severity of judicial repressions

A sufficiently harsh repression was applied to most of those convicted of non-delivery of grain: 1,278 persons of 1,306 (97.7 percent) were sentenced to imprisonment, most for terms over three years. Only 30 convicts (2.3 percent) were sentenced to forced labor.

The breakdown of repressions in terms of severity for each five-day period in January is illustrated by the following data:

Imprisonment:

1 <sup>st</sup>	five-day	January	98.6 %
2 <sup>nd</sup>	five-day	January	98.5 %
3 <sup>rd</sup>	five-day	January	98.5 %
4 <sup>th</sup>	five-day	January	97.7 %

Thus, judicial repressions were stable in their severity for each five-day period.

### D. Class line of repressions

Repressions have been correctly differentiated towards various social groups of convicts: 99.5 percent of kulaks and wealthy [convicts] were sentenced to imprisonment for more than five years, while most of the 97 percent of contract farmers were sentenced to imprisonment for less than five years. [ . . . ]

Peoples' Commissar of Justice and Prosecutor General of Ukrainian SSR, *Poliakov*

TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6353, sheets 67-74;

Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) *Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv* pp.345-348

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#54

Report from Yagoda to Stalin and Molotov on measures for preventing mass exodus of villagers from the Ukrainian SSR, Northern Caucasus and Belarusian SSR

February 2, 1933

In order to intercept people fleeing en masse from Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and Belarus, the OGPU's transport divisions have organized cordons and search groups on the following roadways: N. Caucasus, Ukraine, South-Eastern, Western, Ryazan, Ural, Zlatoustovsk, Oktiabrsk, Moscow-Kazan, Moscow-Belarus-Baltic.

As a result of measures taken from January 22 to 30, 24,961 persons were detained fleeing their places of permanent residence, including 18,379 Ukrainians and 6,225 persons from the Northern Caucasus, and 357 persons from other regions.

The number of people returned to their places of residence is 16,046; 1,016 were arrested; the remaining 7,879 are being investigated

The breakdown of arrests on different roadways is as follows: 2,519 people were detained on the Northern-Caucasian: 2,192 were turned back, 98 were arrested, and 299 are being investigated. On the southern roads 12,842 people were detained, 6,763 sent back, 826 arrested, and 6,250 are being investigated. On the Southeastern, 3,555 people were detained, 2,266 sent back, 32 arrested, and 1,260 are being investigated. On the Western route, 2,274 were detained, 2,270 sent back, and 4 were arrested. On Ryazan-Uralsk, 134 people were detained 134, 7 were sent back, 127 are being checked. On Sam.-Zlat., 45 persons were detained, 22 were sent back and 23 are being checked. On Oktiabrsk, 427 were detained, 412 sent back, and 15 arrested. On Moscow-Kazan, 191 people were detained, 123 were turned back, and 8 were arrested. On Moscow-Kursk 1710 people were detained, 1,672 were sent back, and 18 arrested. On MBB, 264 people were detained, 249 were turned back and 15 were arrested.

Deputy Chairman, OGPU, *Yagoda*

APRF, fond 3, list 30, file 189, sheets 26-27;

Top Secret: From Lubyanka to Stalin on the state of the country in 4 volumes (Moscow, 2001, Volume 4) "*Sovershenno sekretno*". *Lubyanka - Stalinu o polozhenii v strane: v 4 t. p. 398-399*

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#55

Complaint from Hanna Derevinskaya, Krasnopillya, to the Dnipropetrovsk city council about the requisition of food for grain procurement

February 26, 1933

To the City Council of Dnipropetrovsk oblast  
from Citizen *Derevinskaya, Hanna*,  
Krasnopillya

#### STATEMENT

Please consider my statement on the unruly work of brigades dispatched by the village council and the representative of the Petrovsky factory.

On February 10, a grain procurement brigade came to me and asked that I voluntarily give what beans I could. From what I had left to feed the family I gave three kilograms but they took it all (40 kilograms).

On February 23, another brigade made up of the same group came and requested potatoes which I received for labor in workers' gardens on days off for a family of four which works at the Petrovsky factory; the potatoes received from the cooperative were only for feeding our families. Despite the fact that the potatoes were issued by the state and equally among the other workers who worked in the gardens, including the head of the Petrovsky factory brigade, they did not realize that they're undermining spring sowing in the workers' gardens. Acting on their own, they took 125 kilograms of potatoes and 38 kilograms of beets from the cellar. I have fulfilled the entire grain procurement farming quota. I ask your assistance in returning the confiscated food issued by the cooperative.

Appellant Derevinskaya 26.II.1933

DA Dnipropetrovsk oblast, fond 416, list 1, file 113, sheet 331; Collectivization and famine in Ukraine.1929-1933. (Kyiv, 1992, 734 pp) *Kolektyvizatsia i holod na Ukraini 1929-1933*, p. 612.

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#56

Report from the GPU Ukrainian SSR on the mass exodus from Ukrainian villages and operational measures for combating flight

February 1933

The mass exodus of peasants from villages, mostly malicious non-deliverers of grain, was observed over the course of the grain procurement campaign in December and January.

In order to prevent flight from villages, GPU units implemented a number of resolute measures, including: the unconditional ban on issuing any travel documents by village councils; the mobilization of secret agents and village activists to uncover exodus organizers; the creation of mobile patrols by GPU transport divisions and raion bodies; the arrest of exodus organizers and instigators; the request for raion authorities to conduct public education campaigns.

The results of the measures from January 23 to February 2 are as follows:

Mobile patrols detained and filtered 3,861 persons in Ukraine's raions; 3,521 people were returned to their permanent places of residence and 340 were arrested, including kulaks, persons without identification, criminals and those who refused to return to their places of residence.

Kulaks and individuals who refused to return are being prepared for exile while others are being investigated and screened out.

252 exodus organizers and instigators were arrested. Paperwork for sending them to concentration camps is near completion.

During the same period, mobile patrols detained and filtered 16,733 persons on Ukraine's railways:

Collective farmers - 7,106

Private farmers - 7,870

Kulaks - 507

Among the detainees there are 138 persons from the Belarusian SSR, 450 from the Central Black Earth Oblast, 127 from the North Caucasus region, and 192 from the rest of the Union.

15,109 were returned to their places of permanent residence, 1,610 were arrested and delivered to local GPU units, and nine individuals who refused to return were sent to special settlements in Kazakhstan.

8,257 people were returned to Ukraine from the Central Black Earth Oblast.

As a result of these measures, incidents of flight and the propensity to flee have been significantly reduced. For example, from January 15 to 23, before active measures were implemented, 9,236 people left Donetsk oblast; from January 25 to 31, only 325 persons fled that oblast.

In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, which saw the greatest exodus, 15,210 persons left before active measures were taken; 1,255 left from January 25 to February 1. Although incidents of flight have fallen sharply, the propensity to flee among private and collective farmers still exists in that oblast.

According to statistics for Vinnytsia oblast, the flow of fleeing people is slowing down. From January 30 to 31, not a single person was detained by 11 mobile patrols along that oblast's railways.

Incidents of people returning after fleeing, which have increased due to the publication of the governmental resolution on mandatory grain deliveries to the state, have been registered in a

number of raions in that oblast: 401 people returned from January 28 to 31. Incidents of people returning after fleeing have also been registered in other oblasts. According to statistics from GPU divisions, the flight from villages between December 15 and February 2 can be illustrated by the following data:

Mass exodus from villages and collective farms occurred in 215 raions (the number of raions is not specified for the Autonomous Moldovan SSR). In total, 94,433 persons fled. Among them:

Collective farmers - 31,454

Private farmers - 44,454

Kulaks - 8,039

Collective farm activists - 1,017

[...] Most of those fleeing are private farmers and kulaks who have failed to fulfill their grain procurement obligations and are afraid of facing repressions. In the cases of fleeing collective farmers, most have a small number of workdays and attribute their exodus to poor material conditions, shortage of bread and concerns over problems with food supplies.

People fleeing villages are predominantly headed for large industrial centers and areas of new construction.

DA SBU, "Holodomor 1932-1933 v Ukrayini" collection of documents.

#57

Table on deaths and cannibalism due to famine in Havrysh, Sosonka and Yakushinetska villages, Vinnytsia oblast

*February to August, 1933*

#### REGISTER OF DEATHS

Surname, name, patronymic	Died	Age	Place of residence	Trade	Place of work	Place of death	Cause of death
Stashko Vasyl DmytrovYch	28.II.1933	5	Sosonka village	farmer	own farm	—	from famine
Kopytko Martokha Andriyivna	21.III.1933	48	Sosonka village	farmer	own farm	—	from famine
Kukhar Ivan Nikiforovich	28.III.1933	5	Khmilova village	farmer	"Lenin's Legacy" collective farm	at home	sudden death
Paseka Porfyri Tymkovich	5.IV.1933	50	Yakuzhynets village	farmer	"October 13" collective farm	at home	sudden death
Stashko Danylo Martynovych	9.V.1933	42	Sosonka village	farmer	artel member	at home	from famine
Romanenko Ivan Semenovych	23.V.1933	48	Sosonka village	farmer	individual farm	on the road	from famine
Pukas Marko Zakharovych	26.V.1933	44	Havryshivska s/r	farmer	collective farm	at home	from swelling
R. Todoska	11.VI.1933	6	Sosonka village	farmer	individual farm	—	village council and police determined

							that father killed and ate child
R. Hanna	12.VI.1933	3	Sosonka village	farmer	individual farm	—	father killed for food
Zakharevich Hryhori Tymkovich	12.VI.1933	7	Sosonka village	farmer	individual farm	—	killed by cannibal
Kravets Petro Vasylovych	6.VIII 1933	10	Lysohora village	farmer	individual farm	at home	from famine

DA Vinnitsa oblast, fond P-927, list 1, file 181, sheets 5, 9; file 182, sheets 4, 6; file 185, sheets 4, 9; fond P-2061, list 1, file 292, sheet 13; file 294, sheet 2; file 415, sheet 16; fond P-2067, list 1, file 93, sheet 8;

Collectivization and famine in Ukraine.1929-1933. (Kyiv, 1992, 734 pp) *Kolektyvizatsia i holod na Ukraini 1929-1933*, p. 613.

#58

Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo on setting up a special GPU trio in the Ukrainian SSR\*

March 10, 1933

Authorize the trio comprised of Comrades Balitsky, Carlson and Leplevsky with the power to pass rulings of the highest measure to protect society from insurgency and counter-revolution in Ukraine.

RGASPI, fond 17, list 162, file 14, sheet 96.

\* The three leaders of the GPU Ukrainian SSR political police had the summary right to pass death sentences without court hearings.

#59

Report from Vinnytsia oblast GPU to the Ukrainian SSR GPU on the grave conditions with food supplies and population deaths

March 11, 1933

Back at the beginning of February, we began registering significant difficulties with food supplies in a number of raions of our oblast: Trostianets, Zhmerynka, Bratslav, Kalynivka, Pishchane, Kopaihorod, Liubar, Berdychiv, Lytin, Stanislavchyk, Makhnov, Nemyriv and others. To date, Kopaihorod, Lytin, Lypovets, Kalynivka, Bratslav, Kazatyn and Trostianets raions have been hit the worst.

According to recent [but] incomplete data, there are more than 1,000 starving collective farm families, and nearly the same number of private farm families in numerous villages throughout these raions.

There are many people swollen from famine, mostly children, among the above-mentioned families.

156 deaths caused by famine have been registered, including 102 collective farmer deaths.

In Suhaky, Kopaihorod raion, nine people died from famine in one day on March 5, according to



a report by that raion administration. More than 100 people are swollen from starvation. Almost all the dogs and cats have been eaten in that village.

Among the starving, we should single out the collective farmers who had 300 to 400 working days but, as a result of outrageous conditions in certain collective farms, received extraordinarily little [food] (300 to 400 grams per day).

Particularly illustrative in this respect are the villages of:

Bahrianovtsi in Lytin raion, Trostianchyk and Severynivka in Trostianets raion, and Nemyrintsi in Makhnov raion, where pay per workday was extremely low due to systematic misappropriation and squandering of grain.

Six incidents of cannibalism caused by famine, in which parents killed their children and used the flesh for food, have been registered.

In Pinkovka, poor collective farmer K., aged 50, killed his two daughters, aged seven and nine, and used their flesh for food. K. blamed the murder of his children on a long period of starvation. No foodstuffs were found during the search.

On February 12 in Nemyriv raion, a 65-year old semi-kulak-private farmer D., a resident of Dubiny hamlet, killed his 7-year old daughter and used the flesh for food together with his 9-year old daughter. On February 15, he killed his second daughter and consumed the flesh as food together with his wife. D. blamed the famine for committing the murders. (There are other analogous incidents).

There is an incident of a father consciously killing his two children because he had nothing to feed them:

In Lytin raion, in the early days of February, poor private farmer K. lit a fire in the stove and closed the chimney in order to kill his children, two daughters, aged five and eight. The children began to suffocate and cry for help because of the fumes then he strangled them with his own hands, after which he went to the village council and declared his murders. During questioning he said that he committed the murders because there was nothing to eat. No foodstuffs were found during a search of his home.

Information received in the last few days shows that there are very serious difficulties in supplying food to the students of a number of educational institutions located in oblast towns. Students are regularly leaving educational institutions because of the difficulties with food supplies.

In Proskuriv, 16 individuals have abandoned studies in the last month. This accounts for 40 percent of all students. In Tulchyn: 163 students, which accounts for 30 percent. In Berdychiv 343 students, and so on.

In Polonne raion, 13 incidents of swelling from famine have been registered among workers at the pulp and paper plant and porcelain factory.

The number of cases of grave difficulties with food supplies and famine is constantly growing and expanding to a larger number of villages and small towns.

Raion organizations have very low food reserves (nothing at all, in most cases) so it is impossible to expect them to provide any real relief.

Attempts by the oblast to find any food resources whatsoever to help the most-affected population centers have thus far yielded no tangible results due to extremely limited opportunities.

I think there is an urgent need to supply food relief in a centralized manner, taking into account that many of the population centers affected by famine are located in immediate proximity to the border.

Head, Vinnytsia oblast GPU

*Sokolynsky*

TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6274, sheets 146-148;

Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents.

#60

Report from the Ukrainian SSR GPU on problems with food supplies and raions affected by famine in Ukraine (excerpt)

March 12, 1993

According to data reported in February and March, problems with food supplies were registered in 738 population centers of 139 raions, where 11,067 families are starving.

Among the starving, 17,308 people are suffering from acute illnesses due to malnutrition.

In the same period, 2,487 people died of famine.

The largest number of famine cases was registered at the end of February and at the beginning of March. In some places this phenomenon has grown to be massive in scale.

The following is a breakdown of figures according to separate oblasts of Ukraine:

Oblast	Number of raions	Number of pop. centers	Number of affected pop. centers	Number of starving families	Including those sick (number)	Dead
Dnipropetrovsk	35	336	336	6,436	16,211	1,700
Kyiv	27	75	75	1,363	253	417
Vinnytsia	20	82	82	625	201	59
Donetsk	29	83	83	573	409	263
Odesa	14	32	32	131	83	11
Kharkiv	5	20	20	116	151	37
AMSSR [Moldova]	9	110	110	1,823	--	--
Totals	139	738	738	11,067	17,308	2,487

Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv oblasts, and the Autonomous Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic are most affected by food supply problems. The number of starving families afflicted by disease and death is particularly striking in Dnipropetrovsk oblast.

Collective farmers prevail among the starving. They primarily include multi-family homesteads that earned a small number of workdays. Incidents of famine among collective farmers who earned a large number of workdays have also been registered, but they did not receive food supplies from the collective farms due to squandering and embezzlement of grain during the harvest campaign.

Among private farmers, multi-family and primarily poor households are experiencing problems with food supplies. Lately, most of them have not been engaged in farming.

Starving families use various food substitutes (corn cobs and stalks, millet pods, dried straw, herbs, rotten watermelons and beetroots, potato peelings, acacia pods, etc.) as food. Incidents of eating the flesh of cats, dogs and dead horses have been registered. Twenty-eight incidents of cannibalism have been registered. Most of them occurred in the last days of February and at the beginning of March: 19 of 28 cannibalism cases occurred in Kyiv oblast.

In February, 13 incidents of necrophagia were also registered.

In the raions where famine was observed, special commissions were set up to find resources and provide immediate aid. Oblast organizations have allotted food resources to the raions most affected by problems with food supplies.

Deputy Head, Ukrainian SSR GPU  
Secret Political Department, *Aleksandrovsky*

TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6274, sheets 149-158;  
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) *Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv* pp.429-433;  
Tragedy of the Soviet countryside. Collectivization and dekulakization, documents and materials in five volumes. Vol. 3. (Moscow, 2001, 1007 pp) *Tragedia sovietskoi derevni. Kolektyvizatsia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy: v 5 tomakh* pp.653-655

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#61

Report from the Peoples' Commissariat of Land to the CC CP(b)U on famine and death in Kyiv oblast

March 14, 1933

Further to my report dated March 12 on the state of affairs in Uman and Bila Tserkva raions, I am reporting the following information received today from Comrade Rozanov, head of the GPU for Kyiv oblast, concerning the general state of affairs in the oblast.

Incidents of famine and its consequences have been observed in 32 to 34 raions. In 16 raions – there have been 123 registered incidents of cannibalism and necrophagia (including 64 incidents of cannibalism).

In Bila Tserkva raion – 9,603 people swollen from hunger (1,525 people are immobile).

In Buky raion – 3,878 people are starving (3,736 people are immobile). In February and March, 742 people died from famine.

In Smela raion – 404 people are starving badly (203 people are swelling from starvation).

In Pereyasliv raion – 1,113 people are swollen from hunger. 238 people have died from famine.

In Bohuslav raion – 1,931 families are starving.

In the village of Pishchane, Zolotonosha raion – 639 families are starving.

In the village of Sevastianivka, Khrystynivka raion – 250 people are swelling from starvation.

In Lysianka raion – 57 families are starving (96 people are swelling from starvation).

This data is just an illustration based on various sources. No records are being kept.

Widespread beggary and vagrancy have been observed in the towns. Many workers are starving.

The numbers of workers swollen from hunger are as follows: in Zhytomyr – 134 people, in Bila Tserkva – 20 people employed at the May First Factory; in Vasylkiv – 25 people employed at a tannery. The situation is no better in other towns.

In Kyiv, the number of corpses collected off the streets is as follows: 400 in January, 518 in February, 249 in the first ten days of March. In the last few days, parents have been abandoning on average 100 children.

Today, together with the Kyiv oblast committee of CP(b)U, I will complete the assessment of the required volumes of assistance and tomorrow I am going to Kharkiv.

Prior to addressing the issue in general, it is necessary to supply a significant amount of food relief to Kyiv oblast without delay, as I mentioned in my previous report.

The situation here is very serious and requires urgent attention.

Peoples' Commissar for Agriculture, Ukrainian SSR  
*Odyntsev*

TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6274, sheets 176-177;  
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents.  
(Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) *Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv*  
pp.440-441

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#62

Report from the Political Section, Donetsk oblast Land Department to the CP(b)U oblast committee on food shortages, deaths and cannibalism

April 19, 1933

According to reports from the heads of MTS [machine tractor station] political departments, incidents of death and cannibalism have been observed in a number of raions due to the lack of food supplies, including the following separate incidents:

According to the Belokurakan MTS political report dated April 6, the number of destitute people is roughly 2,452 in the Karl Marx, Comintern, Red Breadwinner, New Life, Stalin, and Red Flag Collective Farms. From January to March, 578 people died of malnutrition at these collective farms. They included 218 children, 82 elderly and 189 able-bodied people. Incidents of cannibalism have been observed, as illustrated by the following facts: on March 28, collective farmer Luka Babenko cut off his deceased brother's head, threw his hands and legs into the river, and used the rest for food.

Iryna Khrypunova throttled her nine year-old granddaughter and cooked her internal organs. Anton Khrypunov removed his dead eight year-old sister's internal organs and ate them. A number of other incidents can also be recalled.

According to Starobelsk MTS data, 54 people died due to lack of food in collective farms of the village of Pleshchane and 96 in the village of Shulhine.

According to Osynovo MTS data, in collective farms in the villages of Pysarivka and Bulashovka, 18 and 30 people died. Local and raion organizations provide insufficient assistance. Incidents of absence from work have been registered. There are concerns that the sowing campaign will be impacted if no measures are taken.

Bringing this to your attention, I request you provide appropriate instructions.

Head, Political Section, Oblast Land Department, *Kudriavtsev*  
Secretary, *Tolmachova*

DA Donetsk oblast, fond 326, list 1, file 130, sheet 47;  
Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents.  
(Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) *Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv*  
pp.494-495

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#63

Resolution of the USSR SNK on food and fodder assistance to Ukraine

April 26, 1933

The USSR Council of Peoples' Commissars adopts the following resolution:

1. To supply 850,000 poods of rye to collective farms and private farmers in Ukraine for

processing sugar beets, including 120,000 poods for the processing of collective farm sugar beets.

Food relief to collective farms and private farmers for processing sugar beets shall be distributed among the oblasts as follows:

Vinnitsia oblast	– 260,000 poods
Kyiv	– 160,000 poods
Kharkiv	– 210,000 poods
Chernihiv	– 45,000 poods
Odesa	– 45,000 poods
AMSSR [Moldova]	– 10,000 poods
[Total]	– 730,000 poods

An additional 100,000 poods shall be supplied to Kyiv oblast as part of the oblast's unused seed loan.

2. To supply the following oblasts in Ukraine with rye, in addition to the food relief that has already been provided:

Odesa oblast	– 100,000 poods
Donetsk	– 100,000 poods
Vinnitsa	– 150,000 poods

3. To supply 1,800,000 poods of oats to collective farms in Ukraine, in addition to the fodder assistance that has already been provided:

Dnipropetrovsk oblast	– 250,000 poods
Kyiv	– 350,000 poods
Vinnitsia	– 300,000 poods
Kharkiv	– 350,000 poods
Odesa	– 250,000 poods
Donetsk	– 250,000 poods
AMSSR [Moldova]	– 50,000 poods
[Total]	– 1,800,000 poods

4. Rye and oats shall be supplied from the reserves of the Committee of Reserves; towards this end, the Committee of Reserves shall transfer 1,800,000 poods of oats from Western Oblast to Ukraine.

5. Rye and oats shall be supplied as loans on condition that they shall be returned, in-kind, in the fall of 1933; administrative and transport costs incurred by the state shall be calculated in the amount of 10 poods per every 100 poods of food and fodder loans.

Zahotzerno's expenses from extending the loans shall be covered from the SNK USSR's reserve fund.

Chairman, Council of Peoples' Commissars USSR *V. Molotov (Skryabin)*  
Executive officer, Council of Peoples' Commissars USSR, *I. Miroshnikov*

GARF, fond 5446, list 18, file 468, sheets 37-38.

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#64

Report from the Consul of Italy in Kharkiv to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy on "Famine

and the Ukrainian Situation” (excerpts)

*May 31, 1933*

Famine continues to threaten massive destruction of the population and it's simply impossible to comprehend how the world can remain indifferent to such a tragedy; meanwhile the international press, which is persistent in demanding international condemnation of Germany for its so-called brutal persecution of Jews, remains timidly silent about this mass murder organized by the Soviet government where Jews play a fairly important if not leading role.

What is incontrovertible here is that this famine was caused primarily by an artificially bad harvest aimed at “teaching the peasants a lesson” [...]

There were three apparent motives for such a policy:

1. Passive resistance among the peasantry to collectivization;
2. Belief that this “ethnographic material” will never be suitable for turning into integral Communists;
3. The more or less openly-acknowledged need and convenience of denationalizing raions where Ukrainian and German self-consciousness has been awakened and the resulting threats of potential political hardships in the future. In order to keep the empire together it is better for the Russian population to be dominant. [...]

I believe it imperative to provide a factual account of the situation:

Comrade Frenkel, a member of the GPU collegium, confidentially shared information with a mutual acquaintance that nearly 250 corpses of famine victims are collected in Kharkiv each night. I can personally attest to seeing trucks carrying 10 to 15 corpses pass by the Consulate during the night.

Trucks pulled up to the gates of three large buildings being built near the royal Consulate, and two hired hands with pitchforks went looking for the dead. I saw them use the pitchforks to pick up seven people off the ground: two men, one woman and four children. The others, who woke up in time, quickly disappeared. During this operation one of the workers asked me: “You don't see this where you come from, do you?”

On the morning of the 21<sup>st</sup>, around 30 corpses were dumped like dirty rags on a pile of filth and human excrement near the market gates by the river. On the morning of the 23<sup>rd</sup>, I counted 51 corpses there. One newborn was sucking milk from the breast of its gray-faced, dead mother. [...]

A week ago a special service was created to catch unsupervised children. In addition to the villagers streaming to the city, as there is no chance of surviving in the rural areas, there are also children brought here and left by parents who went back to their villages to die. They hope that someone in the city will provide shelter and take care of them. Lately, these children could be seen crawling and crying on the sidewalks. [...]

Last week, city workers wearing white aprons were mobilized. Walking through the city, they gather children and bring them to the nearest police precinct, where one will often see scenes of desperation, hear screaming and crying. There is a police precinct in front of the Consulate. Delirious screams emanate from within: “I don't want to go to the barracks for the dead! Let me die in peace!”

Around midnight they are transported in trucks to the Northern Donets freight station. Those caught during the day in the sweep through the city are joined by children gathered from the villages and trains, peasant families and lone oldsters.

There are health workers at the station responsible for “sorting” (“They are the heroes of the day,” one doctor told me. Among the health workers, 40 percent have died from typhus that they

contracted while on the job.)

Those who are not bloated and who stand a chance of revival are sent to the barracks on Kholodna Hora [Cold Mountain] where nearly 8,000 people, mostly children, live in agony on beds of hay in sheds.

A doctor who works there told me that people are given milk and soup, but clearly not in sufficient amounts and irregularly, "as available." Between 80 and 100 people die there every day. [...]

The swollen are shuttled on freight trains to rural areas 50 to 60 kilometres outside the city where nobody can see them die. The railcars are filled up and bolted shut. It often happens that, after the cars are filled up, they stand there for two days. A few days ago, a railroad worker heard a noise while passing one the railcars. Looking closer, he found a poor wretch sitting inside and pleading to be freed because of the unbearable stench of the corpses. It turned out he was the only person left alive; he was taken to die in another car, where some people were still alive. Upon reaching the destination, the railcars are unloaded and the bodies thrown into large pits. I was assured that people were seen still alive among the dead; they were very weak and tossed into pits still breathing and convulsing in their last spasms. Nevertheless, the gravediggers kept working and unloading the bodies. I learned these details from the health workers and can thus guarantee the reliability of this information.

An average 30 people die daily in the Kholodna Hora prison. In the village of Hrakovo, located 50 kilometres outside of Kharkiv, only 200 of 1,300 residents remain.

It seems that the Poltava area bore the most horrific brunt, even worse than the area outside Kharkiv. In Poltava, even the doctors are beginning to bloat from the lack of food. [...]

Conclusion: the current cataclysm will lead to the colonization of Ukraine primarily by Russians. This will change the country's ethnographic nature. It is quite possible that, in the foreseeable future, nobody will talk about Ukraine or the Ukrainian nation, meaning that the country will be *de facto* transformed into a Russian region.

With utmost respect,  
Royal consul  
*Gradenigo*

Lettere da Kharkov, La carestia in Ucraina e nel Caucaso del Nord nei rapporti dei diplomatici italiani, 1932-1933. A cura di Andrea Graziosi. - Torino, 1991, pp. 168-174. Translated from Italian into Ukrainian by M. Varvartsev.

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#65

Report from the Peoples' Commissariat of Healthcare to the CP(b)U on the state of public health in Kyiv oblast in connection with famine

June 3, 1933

The condition of the population of Kyiv oblast due to problems with food supplies can be illustrated by statistics from oblast health commissions and departments in 66 raions considered to be most grave.

March		April
25	April 5	15

Number of affected villages	1,214	1,378	1,577
Total number of starving	398,201	474,540	493,644
- Children	178,544	245,283	262,109
- Adults	164,152	208,741	210,138
Total number swelling from hunger	88,721	101,683	97,715
Requiring hospitalization	31,678	37,588	36,632
- Children	16,269	19,026	18,698
- Adults	10,768	14,066	13,952
Hospitalized	11,294	22,248	24,168
- Children	5,457	14,158	15,068
- Adults	6,588	6,679	8,135
Died since January 1	14,548	26,479	27,809
Treated back to health	-	7,776	19,900

1. Analysis of these figures shows growing numbers of affected villages and starving people. While the number of starving adults has stabilized, the number of starving children has grown significantly since April 15. The number of those swollen from starvation is in decline, the number of people that require hospitalization remains the same, and hospitalization has increased, particularly of children; deaths have declined noticeably in the last 10 days.
2. The following raions suffered most: Bohuslav (30,917 starving), Bila Tserkva (30,536) Popelnyan (20,000), Stavyshchan (17,129), Oratov (16,338), Buk (14,920), Obukhiv (14,113), Rzhyschiv (13,987), Uman (13,204), Rokytnia (12,242), Skvir (16,236), Talnov (10,591) Tetiyev (10,480) and Baban (19,064). In other raions, the figures are less than 10,000. The total number of affected Group One raions is 34, Group Two – 17 and Group Three – 15.
3. These figures have to be viewed critically, because the numbers of people actually in distress have been underestimated in some raions (e.g.: Tetiyev raion 10,480 [reported] while there are really more than 22,000) and overestimated in other raions (Bila Tserkva reported 30,536, while in reality no more than 20,000 to 22,000). Although the miscalculations do not have a major impact on the total number of people starving in the oblast, they are important for the allocation of foodstuffs and other forms of government relief.
4. The figures for the people that have died are unreliable, as a review of materials in the regions showed that numbers were much higher. For example, in Skvir raion 802 people were reported to have died from January 1 to March 1, while a review on the ground revealed 1,773 deaths; in Volodarskiy raion 742 deaths were reported as of March 1, when in fact more than 3,000 people had died.
5. The situation with infants, pre-school and young school-aged children should be viewed as the greatest threat; these dangerous conditions are attributable to the bestial attitude of adults to children and grossly insufficient assistance for children in terms of both quality and quantity.
6. Child homelessness requires special attention. There are more than 5,500 children in healthcare institutions alone, representing no more than 40 percent of all homeless children, while the budget has enough to support only 1,000 children. Abandonments [of children] are on the rise and will persist for the next two to three months.

Deputy Peoples' Commissar of Health, Ukrainian SSR, *Kharmandian*

TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6276, pages 1-7;

Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the eyes of historians, in the language of documents. (Kyiv, 1990, 606 pp) *Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorykiv, movoyu dokumentiv* pp.525-530



Summary of reports from MTS Political Sections in Kyiv oblast on famine, death and the anti-Soviet moods among collective farmers (excerpt) \*

June 14, 1933

[...] This past spring the oblast encountered serious problems with food supplies. The food relief received from the CC AUCP(b) – a total volume of 19,401 tons – played a crucial role in alleviating the enormous food supply problems faced by Kyiv oblast collective farms during the crucial period of preparing and executing the sowing campaign (March and April). Nevertheless, the situation with collective farm food reserves grew significantly worse in many of the oblast's raions, especially in May and June. In some raions the number of those swollen and dead from famine is growing to dangerous proportions and are having a definite impact on the execution of agricultural and political campaigns... The heads of POs [local Machine Tractor Station political departments] have written the Political Section [of the oblast MTS] about mass starvation and the dying out of entire villages. For instance, the head of the Petrovsky MTS PO, Kamensky raion, writes:

"...In the last month-and-a-half, incidents of death have been massive in scale. In Rozumievka, 37 people died in the month of May. The situation is especially difficult in the Shliakh Kolhosnyka collective farm of this village. In the Bolshevik Collective Farm in Osota, 120 people died in May. Incidents of mass death have become more frequent than before in the villages of Holykovo, Boltyska and others. In total 3,336 persons have died in the collective farms of 27 villages of this MTS. Very many children are dying. While in March and April we managed to prevent child deaths thanks to oblast and local aid, in May and the first ten days of June, the rate of mortality was unbelievable: 209 persons in 27 villages."

The PO of Piatihorsk MTS, Tetiyev raion, reports:

"...Mortality is reaching catastrophic proportions. In the small village of Nenadykha alone, 113 people died in 20 days during the month of May. Medical clinics have been closed. Many people, especially children, are swollen from famine. They cannot work. There have been many cases of female workers falling in the fields and dying either at home or in the fields. In nurseries, nearly 80 to 70 percent of children are gaunt and swollen. Many schoolchildren are so swollen that that they have a hard time walking to school. Urgent relief is required, especially for the children..."

"...Lately the mortality rate has increased significantly. Up to 2,000 people died in 10 days of June. This is significantly more than during the whole month of May. Incidents of death at work have become more frequent than before..."

*(June 14, 1933 letter from the head of Tetiev MTS PO)*

"...The number of villages requiring relief has grown: 15 of 17 villages are afflicted; 1,000 people died in the raion during the month of April; 459 people died in the first five days of May. There have been incidents of death during work in the fields. Feeding stations are being closed due to lack of produce. Urgent food aid is needed."

*(letter from the head of Tarashcha MTS PO)*

"...The rate of mortality has increased in collective farms. Not only slackers, but also good collective farmers are dying. In Sloboda, 120 people died in 10 days. The situation is the same in other villages. People are dying right in the fields while working. Child mortality rates have increased as well, which is particularly dangerous. There is no food aid in the raion. Workforce shortages have been reported in some villages and collective farms. Urgent food aid is needed."

*(report from the head of the Tetiev MTS PO)*

“...In three villages, Zelena Dubrava, Maidanivka and Hnyzets, acute famine and mortality caused by exhaustion have not been eliminated. In fact their frequency is growing. For instance, in Maidanivka village, 19 people died in March and another 28 in April; 61 people, including 24 able-bodied collective farmers, died in 26 days of May. In these villages there have been incidents of death in the field while working and on the way home from work.”

*(report from the head of the Olshanka MTS PO, Petrovsky raion).*

Similar incidents have been reported by the MTS stations in other raions. According to statistics from 15 MTS political departments, more than 6,000 people have died from exhaustion. [ . . . ]

Deputy head, Political section, Kyiv oblast MTS,  
*M. Yehorov*

TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 20, file 6276, sheets 55-60.

\* The report was sent to Lazar Kaganovich, Agriculture Department, CC AUCP(b); Stanislaw Kosior, General Secretary of the CC CP(b)U Politburo and the chairmen of the Political Departments of the USSR and Ukrainian SSR Peoples' Commissariats of Agriculture.

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#67

Report from the Consul of Italy in Kharkiv to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy on “Famine and Sanitary Conditions” (excerpt)

July 10, 1933

The current situation in Ukraine is horrific. Apart from larger cities and raions within a fifty kilometer radius of cities, the country is engulfed in famine, typhus and dysentery. There are also cases of cholera and even plague which, until recently, were sporadic in number [...]

The famine has decimated half the rural population.

Police apprehend fleeing peasants with livid brutality (I have noticed that the urban population willingly take part in this hunt for villagers, either because of some incomprehensible feeling of self-defense, or under the influence of crafty propaganda, or an overwhelming desire to inflict torture). If somebody tries to escape from the police transports, there are always a dozen city residents prepared to chase him down, beat him up and turn him in to the police. There are orders prohibiting doctors from administering medical treatment to villagers in the cities.

Two thousand such poor souls are rounded up every day and shipped out during the night. Entire families, that came to the city in the last hope of avoiding death from starvation, are mercilessly held in barracks for one or two days and then transported, hungry, 50 kilometers from Kharkiv and thrown into rain-formed gullies.

Many of them can no longer move and simply die on the spot; some manage to escape and others are fortunate enough to make it back to the city where they end up begging for food. One of them told me about an area located between the ponds beyond Rai-Yelenivka, a four-hour walk from the nearest railway station. Every three to four days, a team of gravediggers is dispatched there to bury the dead.

Some doctors whom I know confirmed that death rates in the villages often reach 80 percent, but never less than 50 percent. Kyiv, Poltava and Sumy regions were most afflicted by the famine and can be described as depopulated.

I am adding yet another name to the list of dead villages: Lutova near Kharkiv.\* Prior to the famine its population was 1,500. Today, it is just under 90.

As for sanitary conditions, they can be no worse than their current state. Doctors are prohibited from speaking about typhus and death from starvation. They are also prohibited from compiling statistics that may be interesting from the scientific point of view. Nonetheless, I was able to obtain the following information about pathologies due to undernourishment. People who are unable to secure bread (very black bread with various additives) gradually grow weaker and die of heart failure without any signs of disease. Meanwhile, those that consumed only fluids and milk experience gradual swelling of their joints and legs. They also die from heart failure. There are frequent cases of hallucinations when people mistake children for animals, slaughter and eat them. Those who managed to regain their strength using this kind of food did not recall wanting to eat their own children and denied ever having such intentions. [...]

Royal Consul *Sergio Gradenigo*

Lettere da Kharkov, La carestia in Ucraina e nel Caucaso del Nord nei rapporti dei diplomatici italiani, 1932-1933. A cura di Andrea Graziosi. - Torino, 1991, pp. 189-191. Translated from Italian into Ukrainian by M. Varvartsev.

\* The author was most likely referring to the village of Liutivka, Zolochiv raion

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#68

Resolution of SNK USSR on resettlement to Kuban, Terek and Ukraine

August 31, 1933

The Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of SSR resolves:

The All-Union Resettlement Committee of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall organize the resettlement of 10,000 families to Kuban and Terek, and 15,000 to 20,000 families to Ukraine (Steppe) by the beginning of 1934.

Chairman, Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of SSR *V. Molotov (Skryabin)*  
Executive Director, Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of SSR *I. Miroshnikov*

GARF, fond 5446, list 18, file 470, page 185.

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#69

Resolution of CC CP(b)U Politburo on additional resettlement of Steppe raions (excerpt)

September 11, 1933

Prepare the following numbers of added resettlements into the steppe regions during the fourth quarter of 1933: 22,000 families to Dnipropetrovsk, 9,000 families to Odesa and 4,000 families to Donetsk oblasts.

Recruit additional resettlers from among those collective farmers, laborers and private farmers who are willing to join the collective farms of the Steppe.

Establish the following recruitment targets: 8,000 families each from Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts

and 6,000 families from Vinnytsia oblast.

Conduct additional resettlement to Dnipropetrovsk oblast from Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts; to Odesa oblast from Vinnytsia and Kyiv oblasts and into Donetsk from Chernihiv oblast. [...]

TsDAHO Ukrayiny, fond 1, list 6, file 321, sheets 6-9.

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#70

Report from Otto Schiller, agricultural expert, Embassy of Germany in the USSR to the German Ministry of food and agriculture (excerpt)\*

September 18, 1933

#### FAMINE IN THE SOVIET UNION

[...] The causes of the famine catastrophe will not be found in natural events, that is to say a bad harvest. Even if one disregards official and other harvest estimates and assumes the lowest estimate, then rational distribution would have provided if not a full diet, then at least enough food to avoid large scale death by famine. Grain exports, which villagers often blame for the famine, are not large enough with respect to the general harvest to explain the food catastrophe. Last year, [exports] were 1.3 million tonnes with a general harvest collection of nearly 60 million tonnes. The accusation that large volumes were put away in state reserves for military purposes during the last year is also dubious because the capacity of state storage facilities cannot be expanded so quickly.

The real reasons for the famine are being kept hidden; they can only be explained by enormous organizational and distribution errors and overexertion of grain procurement measures.

Everywhere in the starving areas, villagers share the view that the harvest provided enough food and that famine was caused solely through brutal requisition methods. It remains to be seen whether this was due to gross abuses by local government bodies and local chaos, or on orders from the top, the last kernel of grain was systematically extracted from the villages, to bring the villagers to their knees through famine and force them to work in collective farms as was described in my 18.7.1933 report.

It is very difficult to provide even approximate figures for famine deaths. The Soviet government cannot provide any exact information because many of the starving died on the road or were buried without identification and death registration. In many cases, it's difficult to tell whether starvation or disease was the cause of death. An approximate notion of the scale of famine deaths can be provided by the fact that the above-mentioned zone of famine in territorial size comprises nearly a third of the entire area, and half the entire population, of European Russia. Nearly every village has seen deaths from famine; in the worst areas, 25 to 50 percent of the population died out, while in other villages, only individual cases of death from famine were established. Based on village population reduction ratios, the victims of the hunger catastrophe number in the millions. I would, on the other hand, not consider the quoted number of 10 million deaths to be an exaggeration. In addition, most of the remaining population in starving areas has serious health problems due to the hardships endured. This is foremost the case with children, a significant number of whom, crippled by famine, will never have the chance to develop into normal human beings.

Within the area of starvation, the forms of famine are the same everywhere, but gradation differs significantly according to location. Particularly hard hit was the western part of [Soviet] Ukraine, a large part of the Northern Caucasus and some places of the Lower Volga (left bank and lands along the mountainside). In these worst areas, the famine has caused such significant damage to agriculture through widespread death and destruction of villages, that even should famine

disappear, the normal future development of these villages seems impossible without repopulating and rebuilding. But these areas are not significant in size. [...]

Moscow, 18 September 1933  
Original signed by *Schiller*

Der ukrainische Hunger-Holocaust: Stalins verschwiegener Völkermord 1932/33 an 7 Millionen ukrainischen Bauern im Spiegel geheimehaltener Akten d. dt. Auswärtigen Amtes; e. Dokumentation; aus d. Beständen d. Polit. Archivs im Auswärtigen Amt, Bonn / hrsg. u. eingeleitet von D. Zlepko. – Sonnenbühl: Wild, 1988. – pp. 194-196.  
Translated from German to Ukrainian by M. Dubyk.

\* A copy of this report was also sent to German Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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# 71

Letter from Kaganovich to Stalin on resettlements to areas of the Northern Caucasus and Ukraine depopulated by the Holodomor (excerpt)

October 2, 1933

Dear Comrade Stalin.

1) You inquired about the operational tasks we've assigned the resettlement committee for 1933. At the end of August, we ordered them to organize the resettlement of 10,000 to Kuban and Terek in early 1934 and 15,000 to 20,000 families to Ukraine's Steppe.\*. After Comrade Muralov arrived, we called him out and became convinced that he is currently recruiting from among army units only, and has nothing organized on location. We instructed him to plan out the entire campaign: identify resettlement locations, send people to organize housing and all necessary equipment, provide a timetable with exact deadlines, secure food, and so on. He is to present all this in a few days. We think that in the remaining three months of 1933 he will not be able to do any more; thus we are not assigning him any additional tasks. It may be necessary to organize spontaneous resettlement beginning with some Middle Volga raions. This will have to be considered...

RGASPI, fond 558, list 11, file 741, sheets 80-81;  
Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936 (Moscow, 2001, 798 pp) *Stalin i Kaganovich. Perepyska. 1931-1936* pp.370-371

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#72

Resolution of the CC AUCP(b) Politburo on the resettlement of collective farmers within the Ukrainian SSR and from other oblasts of the USSR

December 9, 1933

1. Approve the proposal from the CC CP(b)U, RNK Ukrainian SSR and the All-Union Resettlement Committee on the internal Ukrainian resettlement of 16,000 homesteads in the months of January, February and March of 1934 from the oblasts:

Chernihiv - 7,000 families to Donetsk oblast - 3,000

		to Dnipropetrovsk oblast	-	4,000
Kyiv	- 6,000 families	to Odesa oblast	-	2,000
		to Dnipropetrovsk oblast	-	2,000
Vinnitsa	- 3,000 families	to Kharkiv oblast	-	2,000
		to Odesa oblast	-	1,000

This resettlement shall provide the same benefits and conditions as resettlements from the Russian SFSR and Belarusian SSR, except for reducing the exemption from paying taxes to one year instead of three.

2. Order the Ukrainian SSR CC CP(b)U, RNK and the Party and executive committees in Chernihiv, Kyiv and Vinnytsia oblasts to complete recruitment of willing resettlers by 1.1.1934 and for the Party and executive committees in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts to repair 16,000 homes and yards for the resettlers no later than 15.1.34.

3. Request the SNK USSR to supply the materials necessary for the repairs of homes (glass, nails, timber) and the money necessary for organizing resettlement.

4. Authorize the All-Union Resettlement Committee to additionally resettle\*, under the previously-established terms, 3,000 homesteads from the Central Black Earth Oblast to Kharkiv oblast and 300 Jewish farms from Western Oblast to Dnipropetrovsk oblast.

RGASPI, fond 17, list 3, file 936, sheets 12-13.

\* In August, 1933, the SNK USSR initially ordered 20,000 families resettled in Ukraine's Steppe. On December 29, 1933, the RNK reported the plan for resettling collective farmers in Ukraine was over-performed at 104 percent (See Documents 68 and 73.)

#73

Report of the All-Union Resettlement Committee on resettling collective farmers to Ukraine (with table)

December 29, 1933

Express. Secret.

To Head of GULAG OGPU Comrade *Berman*

The All-Union Resettlement Committee of the SNK USSR is sending operational report No. 38 on resettlement to Ukraine as of December 28 this year. In addition, the AURC of the SNK reports that the proposed resettlement plan was performed by 104.76 % \*. In total 21,856 collective farms, 117,149 persons, 14,879 horses, 21,898 cows and 38,705 heads of other livestock (the latter includes only swine and sheep) have been relocated. The report is attached.

Deputy Chairman, All-Union Resettlement Committee,  
USSR SNK *Rud'*

[ATTACHMENT] Secret

SUMMARY DATA ON ECHELONS OF RESETTLERS SENT TO UKRAINE AS OF  
DECEMBER 28, 1933:

Source	Destination	Number households	Numbe rs horses	Number cows	Number other livestock	Number Echelons	% Plan completion
Gorky	Odesa	2,120	1,348	2,062	2,050	35	106

Ivanov	Donetsk	3,527	1,619	3,498	1,980	44	104
BSSR	Odesa	4,630	3,864	5,295	10,924	61	103
C.	Kharkiv	4,800	2,329	3,472	5,644	80	106.6
Western	Dnipropetrovsk	6,679	5,719	7,571	18,097	109	102.7

1. On 28 December 1933, 329 echelons were dispatched, 21,856 households, 117,149 family members, 14,879 horses, 21,898 cows and 38,705 heads of small livestock.
2. The plan for transporting collective farmers into Ukraine is complete and fulfilled by 104.7%.

Deputy chairman, All Union Resettlement Committee,  
USSR SNK *Rud'*

RGAE, fond 5675, list 1, file 33, sheet 56;  
Collectivization and famine in Ukraine.1929-1933. (Kyiv, 1992, 734 pp) *Kolektyvizatsia i holod na Ukraini 1929-1933* p. 642.

\* As stated in the document. Further calculations show 104.076%

==== THE END ====